# The Office of Collection and Dissemin thon\*

The cabal of colonels who came to CIG with General Vandenberg. and read in an Army regulation that the intelligence process consisted of collection, evaluation, and dissemination. On their advice, Vandenberg established an Office of Collection, an Office of Evaluation (ORE), and an Office of Dissemination. 597/ The Office of Collection had nothing to do with the collection of

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For a more extended treatment of this subject, see "Organizational History of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1950-1953," DCI Historical Series, HS-2, Chapter V.

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\*\* James M. Andrews, the ADCD, is not to be confused with the contemporary Advisor for Management.

See above, p. 46.

State and the Pentagon the intelligence materials that ONE would "correlate and evaluate." The Office of Dissemination would then distribute to the White House, State, and the Pentagon the "strategic and national policy intelligence" that ONE produced. Two months passed before it occurred to some bright mind that the same set of liaison officers and couriers who collected information for ONE could also disseminate the ONE product, that two separate offices for collection and dissemination were not required. The two offices were then combined to form one Office of Collection and Dissemination. 598/

This episode is indicative of the level of sophistication that General Vandenberg and his preferred advisors brought to the direction of intelligence.

The plan for ORE included a "Library," which was to contain not only standard reference works, but also a central file of all the intelligence documents that would come into ORE's possession.

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then the CIA Executive for Administration and Management, and then in ORE, took particular interest in this "Library" and from it developed the idea of a Reference Center in which all of the intelligence materials in the possession of the Government

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would be deposited, indexed, and made available to all intelligence

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rigencies. As might have been expected, the Departmental agencies flatly refused to surrender their files to CIG; the Reference Contor could be no more than CIG's central reference facility. 597/

The management of ONE, engrossed in more urgent internal and external problems, paid no attention to the development of the Reference Center. For that reason transferred it from ORE to his own office, in September 1947. 600/ In January 1948 he engaged James M. Andrews to be its Chief. 601/ Andrews was an enthusiastic advocate of the use of business machines for the indexing, retrieval, and analysis of information.\* In May 1948 the Reference Center was merged into the original OCD and Andrews was made the Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination. 602/

As organized by Andrews in 1948, OCD consisted of the Library (a general repository of intelligence documents), three specialized registers (Biographic, Industrial, and Graphics), and a Machine Techniques Branch -- all from the Reference Center -- and a Liaison Branch, the old OCD. 603/ Thus it was the Reference Center that had taken over OCD, rather than vice versa.



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Andrews sought to instill in OCD personnel the idea that OCD existed only to serve the other components of CIA, and the Departmental agencies as well, insofar as practicable. They must forget about pretensions to superior coordinating authority and do their utmost to service every demand or request that came to them, no matter what the source. 604/ That was indeed a remarkable doctrine in the CIA of 1948.

The NSC Survey Group examined OCD just after this reorganization had gone into effect. It had no cognizance of the previous period of trial and error. It could not know how the new arrangement would work out.

On theoretical rather than empirical grounds, the Survey Group concluded that the Liaison Branch of OCD had a coordinating function that should be assigned to its proposed "Coordination Division."

The rest of OCD (the former Reference Center) was plainly related to research and should therefore be assigned to the proposed "Research and Reports Division." 605/ Andrews' comment on this proposal was that it was, in effect, a return to the situation that had existed before September 1947, which had been unsatisfactory. 606/ Hillenkoetter rejected the proposal, but the NSC approved it in NSC 50. 607/

<sup>\*</sup> By this time the Liaison Branch had undertaken the coordination of specific collection requirements, as distinguished from the general coordination of collection operations, which remained a function of ICAPS.

In accordance with the "Dulles Report" and NSC 50, Jackson included in his plans for ORR a Reference Division composed of the former Reference Center elements of OCD. The Liaison Branch would go to OTC and OCD would cease to exist. 608/

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Andrews was resigned to the demise of OCD, but determined that the Reference Center he had created should not be subordinated to ORR, as the "Library" had been to ORE. No doubt with the support of Andrews appealed to General Smith. His line was that OCD was a service organization, in the service of all of the component of CIA, and of the IAC agencies as well. It should not be subordinated to just one of its many customers. The result would be the neglect from which the Library had suffered in ORE, or at least a reduction in its functions to suit the limited interests of ORR. If OCD must be abolished, let all of its elements be assigned to OIC, where they could continue to serve the whole intelligence community. 609/

General Smith was no doubt impressed by this argument -- and even more by Jamie Andrews' spirit and his grasp of his business. Smith readily agreed that the Reference Center elements of OCD should not be subordinated to ORR. At the same time he perceived that the day-to-day service operations of OCD would be incongruous

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ir. OIC. Most importantly, he saw that James Reber was not the man to take the place of James Andrews in charge of that business. 610/ His decision was to leave Andrews and OCD exactly as he had found them. 611/

The only changes made in OCD during Smith's term as DCI were the addition of a new Special Register, for the machine-indexing of Comint materials, and a great increase in the personnel strength, in keeping with the general intensification of intelligence activities 25X1A1a the period.\* In June 1950 the authorized strength of OCD had

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This rate of increase was actually greater than that of the substantive offices that OCD served. 612/

# The Office of Operations

The advent of Bedell Smith had little effect on the operations of the three constituent elements of the Office of Operations. The Office as a whole was subordinated to the Deputy Director, Plans, during 1951, but was transferred to the Deputy Director, Intelligence, on 1 March 1952.

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\*\* For a more extended treatment of this subject, see "Office of Operations: Overt Collection, 1946-65," DDI Historical Series, DCS-

<sup>\*</sup> See below, Chapter VIII.

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